Logic, Philosophy : A Collection of Essays 2 by Wang ..
In the early 1970s Thomas Nagel argued in “What Is It Like toBe a Bat?” (1974) that consciousness itself—especiallythe subjective character of what it is like to have a certain type ofexperience—escapes physical theory. Many philosophers pressedthe case that sensory qualia—what it is like to feel pain, tosee red, etc.—are not addressed or explained by a physicalaccount of either brain structure or brain function. Consciousness hasproperties of its own. And yet, we know, it is closely tied to thebrain. And, at some level of description, neural activities implementcomputation.
Computation, Logic, Philosophy: A Collection of Essays
In the years since Husserl, Heidegger, et al. wrote,phenomenologists have dug into all these classical issues, includingintentionality, temporal awareness, intersubjectivity, practicalintentionality, and the social and linguistic contexts of humanactivity. Interpretation of historical texts by Husserl et al.has played a prominent role in this work, both because the texts arerich and difficult and because the historical dimension is itself partof the practice of continental European philosophy. Since the 1960s,philosophers trained in the methods of analytic philosophy have alsodug into the foundations of phenomenology, with an eye to20th century work in philosophy of logic, language, andmind.
Since the late 1980s, and especially the late 1990s, a variety ofwriters working in philosophy of mind have focused on the fundamentalcharacter of consciousness, ultimately a phenomenological issue. Doesconsciousness always and essentially involve self-consciousness, orconsciousness-of-consciousness, as Brentano, Husserl, and Sartre held(in verying detail)? If so, then every act of consciousness eitherincludes or is adjoined by a consciousness-of-that-consciousness. Doesthat self-consciousness take the form of an internal self-monitoring?If so, is that monitoring of a higher order, where each act ofconsciousness is joined by a further mental act monitoring the baseact? Or is such monitoring of the same order as the base act, a properpart of the act without which the act would not be conscious? A varietyof models of this self-consciousness have been developed, someexplicitly drawing on or adapting views in Brentano, Husserl, andSartre. Two recent collections address these issues: David WoodruffSmith and Amie L. Thomasson (editors), Phenomenology and Philosophy ofMind (2005), and Uriah Kriegel and Kenneth Williford (editors),Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness (2006).
Computation logic philosophy a collection of essays
The UCI Interdisciplinary Center for the Scientific Study of Ethics and Morality was established in 2003 by a group of scholars interested in recent scientific research that yields insight on the origins and causes of morality. In creating the center, UCI faculty both address a topic that is becoming one of the new frontiers in science and reflect critically on the moral implications of this new frontier. The center focuses on the etiology of ethical behavior and differs in several important ways from existing centers dedicated to the discussion of ethics. Traditional academic approaches tend to originate in philosophical, foundational, or religious discussions of ethics. They tend to be humanistic in orientation and emphasize abstract, theoretical considerations of what constitutes ethics and morality. The center complements this traditional approach and explores the scientific and/or the empirically verifiable factors that influence morality, using a variety of methodologies that examine factors contributing to and driving moral action in a variety of social, psychological, and biological contexts. The center encourages ties between scholars interested in ethics in humanities and the sciences—including social science, social ecology, biological sciences, and medicine—building on the interdisciplinary tradition at UCI, complementing, rather than duplicating, existing efforts. Visit for more information.
Paraconsistent Logic | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Consider logic. As we saw, logical theory of meaning led Husserlinto the theory of intentionality, the heart of phenomenology. On oneaccount, phenomenology explicates the intentional or semantic force ofideal meanings, and propositional meanings are central to logicaltheory. But logical structure is expressed in language, either ordinarylanguage or symbolic languages like those of predicate logic ormathematics or computer systems. It remains an important issue ofdebate where and whether language shapes specific forms of experience(thought, perception, emotion) and their content or meaning. So thereis an important (if disputed) relation between phenomenology andlogico-linguistic theory, especially philosophical logic and philosophyof language (as opposed to mathematical logic per se).
Inconsistent Mathematics | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
More recently, analytic philosophers of mind have rediscoveredphenomenological issues of mental representation, intentionality,consciousness, sensory experience, intentional content, andcontext-of-thought. Some of these analytic philosophers of mind harkback to William James and Franz Brentano at the origins of modernpsychology, and some look to empirical research in today’s cognitiveneuroscience. Some researchers have begun to combine phenomenologicalissues with issues of neuroscience and behavioral studies andmathematical modeling. Such studies will extend the methods oftraditional phenomenology as the Zeitgeist moves on. Weaddress philosophy of mind below.